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Interpretation of Tax Law in China: 
Moving Towards the Rule of Law?
❒
Dongmei Qiu*
A unique feature in the interpretation of tax laws in China is that administrative 
organs have enjoyed a near monopoly status in interpreting rules. The high 
centralization of powers combined with the lack of effective checks leads to 
various problems which in turn jeopardize the legitimacy of interpretations made 
by administrative organs. This article points out that, in the short run, while 
this monopoly status will not be changed fundamentally, the problems may be 
alleviated through the “self-constraints” adopted within the government and 
applied in order to comply, more effectively, with the requirements of the “rule 
of law”. Meanwhile, external factors are playing an increasingly important 
role in shaping the development and interpretation of tax law, including the 
supervision from civilians, tax professionals and non-government organizations 
as well as the influence of the international tax community.
I. Introduction
To understand the interpretation of tax law in China, the first and 
foremost question to explore is not the methodology but the allocation 
of interpretative powers.1 In China, the interpretation of law, in general, 
based on the directive of law interpretation2 and the Law of Legislation, 
is considered to be a power distributable among the legislature, judiciary 
and administrative organs. In the field of tax law, this power is, in 
practice, predominantly exercised by administrative bodies, especially 
the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the Ministry of Finance 
* Postdoctoral fellow at Hong Kong University; Research fellow, Center for International Tax 
Law and Comparative Taxation, Xiamen University. I would like to give special thanks to Prof. 
Richard Cullen at the University of Hong Kong for valuable input to the writing of this article. 
I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer for the constructive comments. As this article is 
based on earlier work carried out for the book “Legal Interpretation of Tax Law”, I would like to 
thank the book editors, Dr. Robert van Brederode and Prof. Rick Krever, for their kind support. 
Any errors, however, remain the responsibility of the author.
1 See Wu Jingsong, “Reflection on Tax Administrative Interpretation in China” (in Chinese) 
(2010) 3 Taxation Research 69–72; Hu Yuhong, Principles and Techniques of Law (in Chinese) 
(China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2002) 45.
2 See Resolution on the Provision of an Improved Interpretation of Law, adopted in the 19th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC), May 1981. For more 
detailed discussion, see Section II.
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(MoF), whereas the judiciary and the legislature play very limited roles. 
The legislature in China has been largely absent from the tax legislative 
work and has delegated its powers on tax legislation to the administrative 
bodies. This leads to the effect that the interpretive activities carried out 
by the latter bodies often have a legislative nature de facto.
The aim of this article is to address the following three questions. 
What are the causes leading to the high centralization of interpretative 
powers in the hands of administrative bodies in the field of tax law? How 
are the tax rules interpreted by administrative organs in practice? What 
are the development trends that we may see in the future?
The first question is explained from two aspects in Sections III and IV. 
Firstly, in terms of the legislative interpretation, although the legislative 
body, namely the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(SCNPC), is given the exclusive power to interpret the statutes,3 the 
interpretations given by the SCNPC on tax statutes are close to none.4 
The absence of the SCNPC in interpreting tax statutes is closely related 
to the devolution of the tax legislative powers in the mid-1980s, which 
led to the dominance of rules issued by lower authorities governing the 
tax law systems. Second, the courts’ role in the interpretation of tax rules 
has been marginalized. Judicial interpretation in the meaning of tax rules 
by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is rare. It is very seldom that the 
courts voice constructive opinions in cases regarding the application of 
tax rules. The author attempts to explore the underlying reasons for these 
developments from the cultural, legislative and institutional perspectives.
The second question is analyzed in Section V. The author reviews 
the regulatory framework to explore the allocation of the interpretative 
powers between the State Council and its two ministries, ie the SAT and 
the MoF. The high centralization of interpretative powers on the SAT 
and the MoF causes problems which can be illustrated by the example of 
interpreting anti-avoidance tax rules under the Enterprise Income Tax 
Law (EITL). Despite all the infirmities, the author argues that there are 
still promising developments as the SAT, driven by the intrinsic regulatory 
constraints, is moving itself so as to adhere more closely to basic rule of 
law principles which requires predictability, transparency and legitimacy. 
Lastly, how the SAT and the local tax agencies are interrelated on the 
interpretation of tax law is explored.
3 The interpretative power enjoyed by the legislature is provided in the Constitution and the Law 
of Legislation. See Section II.
4 There are very few interpretation issued by the SCNPC on the tax statute. These tax related 
interpretations are tax crimes, such as SCNPC, Interpretations on the Provisions Regarding 
“Other Invoices for Export Rebate and Tax Offset” of the Criminal Law in PR China, 
promulgated and effective on 29 December 2005.
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As to the third question, the author suggests three possible routes 
via which compliance with “rule of law” principles by China’s tax 
administration in their interpretative activities may be improved. Route 
one is to strictly define the interpretative powers of the administrative 
organs so that these powers will not trespass on the legislative powers 
exercised by the legislature. The first step, to further this aim, is for 
the legislature in China to reclaim its legislative powers in the tax law 
arena which are currently retained by administrative organs. Second, the 
awakening awareness of Chinese civilians on the “rights as taxpayers” and 
the increasing involvement of tax professionals and non-governmental 
entities can be another force to push the tax administration to be more 
attentive to the legality of their interpretative activities. Thirdly, China’s 
role as a major emerging economic power and its intention to comply 
with international norms compels the SAT to join the dialogues with 
other countries and international organizations, typically the OECD 
and the UN, in formulating its interpretative rules. As argued by the 
author in Section VI, while implementing the rule of law principle in the 
interpretation of tax law in China will be a long-run process, clear and 
positive signs have emerged to show that China is moving towards this 
direction by the means of these three routes.
II. Brief Introduction to the Interpretation of Tax Law
In China, the Constitution provides little guidance on matters of legal 
interpretation except for a brief mention of the power of the SCNPC 
to interpret the Constitution and statutes.5 While there is no single 
law on the interpretation of legislation, the existing scheme of legal 
interpretation is mainly based on the “1981 Resolution” adopted at the 
meeting of the SCNPC.6 Based on this Resolution, the interpretative 
powers of law in China are distributed to the legislature, judiciary and 
executive organs. The two highest judicial organs, the SPC and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP),7 have the powers, respectively, 
to interpret questions involving the specific application of laws from 
the court trials and the procuratorial work. For questions involving 
5 Articles 67(1) and 67(4), Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth 
Session of the Fifth NPC on 4 December 1982, and the latest revision is on 14 March 2004.
6 Resolution on the Provision of an Improved Interpretation of Law, adopted in the 19th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Fifth NPC, May 1981.
7 The SPP is the highest agency at the national level responsible for both prosecution and 
investigation in China. It is mainly responsible for supervising regional procuratorates and 
special procuratorates to perform legal supervision by law. The SPP has to report its work to the 
NPC and SCNPC, to whom it is responsible, and accepts their supervision.
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the specific application of laws unrelated to judicial or procuratorial 
work, the State Council, the highest executive body in China, together 
with  the responsible departments, shall provide interpretation.8 Above 
all, the SCNPC has the power to interpret statutes through making 
additional stipulations whenever there are loopholes in existing statutes 
or contradictory interpretations given by the SPC and the SPP.9
While the 1981 Resolution was meant to draw a clear delineation 
on the interpretative powers among different organs, it failed to do so 
due to  the inherent ambiguities and contradictions.10 The problems 
underlying this Resolution were inevitable due to the following fact: in 
China, all the government organs, including legislature, judiciary and the 
executive, are subordinate to the leadership of the Communist Party and 
the law is expected to cope with the changing policies of the Party from 
time to time.11 To achieve this purpose, the interpretation of law needs to 
retain a high degree of flexibility so that the law can be changed swiftly 
to adapt to the varying political situations.
But this flexibility has its cost and leads to frustrating aftermaths: 
the overlap of interpretative powers among different organs, the lack of 
transparency in the interpretative process and the lack of standardized 
usage of titles and the legal-effects obscurity of these interpretive rules.12 
Many of these problems penetrate into the interpretation of tax law except 
one: in the tax field, the overlap of interpretative powers among the 
legislature, judiciary and the execution rarely occurs.13 It is the executive 
bodies, namely the State Council and its ministries typically represented 
by the SAT and the MoF, that have played the leading and predominant 
role in the interpretation of China’s tax law. Although the legislative 
bodies and judicial organs have been authorized to interpret the tax law 
nominally, their powers have actually lain dormant in practice.
8 Article 3, 1981 Resolution.
9 Articles 1 and 2, 1981 Resolution.
10 See Kong Xiaohong, “Legal Interpretation in China” (1990) 6 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 491, 497; Zhou Yongkun, “The Conflict between Legal Interpretation and Government 
in Accordance with a System of Law” (in Chinese) (2006) 27 Modern Law Science 5; Wei 
Shengqiang, “Who shall Interpret the Law—Consideration on the Allocation of the Law 
Interpretative Powers in China” (in Chinese) (2006) 3 Legal Science 38–47.
11 See Mo Zhang, “The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse 
for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience” (2010) 24 Temple International & Comparative Law 
Journal 1–64.
12 See Wei Shengqiang, “We Need a Uniform Legal Interpretation Law” (in Chinese) (2007) 
1 Legal Science 33–34.
13 See eg Wu Jingsong, “Reflection on Tax Administrative Interpretation in China” (in Chinese) 
(2010) 3 Taxation Research 69–72; Sun Jianbo, Research on Tax Law Interpretation (in 
Chinese) (Law Press, 2006) 239–259; Li Danmei, “Study on the Interpretation of Tax Law” 
(in Chinese) (2003) 3 Finance and Tax Law Review 294–296; Cai Qiaoping, “Issues of Reduction 
in Effectiveness of China’s Tax Law” (in Chinese) (2002) 2 Finance and Tax Law Review 156.
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III.  Missing Voice of the Legislative Body in the Interpretation 
of Tax Law
The Law of Legislation14 provides the legal basis for the SCNPC15 
to interpret statutes. Under Art 42, the SCNPC shall provide the 
interpretation on a particular statute whenever a provision of the statute is 
ambiguous or the statute, after the enactment, needs further clarification 
to address new situations. The legislative interpretation given by the 
SCNPC on the statute has the equal legal effect as the statute. This 
power, however, was rarely exercised by the SCNPC in the tax field.16 
The reasons can be understood by reviewing the current status of tax 
legislation in China.
The existing framework of tax law in China stands as a pyramid with 
three tiers: on the top are four statutes legislated by the NPC and the 
SCNPC, namely the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection, 
Individual Income Tax Law (IIT Law), ETIL, and the Vehicle and Vessel 
Usage Tax Law (VVUT Law). The three types of taxes governed by the 
statues are IIT, EIT and VVUT, which stand out among the 18 types of 
taxes China currently have. They have generated around a quarter 
of  tax revenue in the year of 2013.17 That is to say, the other 15 types 
of taxes which account for nearly three quarter of tax revenue in China 
are provided by the rules with a lower rank of legal effect. A common 
feature of the four tax statutes is that they are strikingly short in length 
and concise in content.18 They normally contain the broad principles of 
fundamental tax matters and leave the detailed provisions to be dealt 
with by implementation regulations issued by the State Council.
On the second tier are the regulations issued by the State Council which 
number more than 20. Under the Law of Legislation, the State Council 
is empowered to adopt administrative regulations, rules and measures to 
carry out laws enacted by the NPC and the SCNPC.19 This power has 
14 National People’s Congress, Legislative Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order of the 
President [2000] No. 31, promulgated on 15 March 2000, effective on 1 July 2000.
15 The NPC and its standing committee, i.e. SCNPC, are the highest legislative body in China.
16 Note 4 above.
17 Based on the statistics released by the MoF, the total tax revenue in China amounts to more 
than RMB 11 trillion in the year 2013. The revenue from the EIT is RMB 2241.6 billion, 
while the revenue from the IIT is RMB 653 billion. The VVUT is a small tax levied on the 
usage of vehicle and vessel either according to the number of taxable vehicles or the net-weight 
capacity of the taxable vehicles. It generates less than one percent of the total tax revenue in 
China. See http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201401/t20140123_1038541.html 
(visited 14 Apr 2014).
18 For instance, there are only 15 articles in the Individual Income Tax Law, 60 articles in the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law and 13 articles in the Vehicle and Vessel Tax Law. The longest 
statute is the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection with 94 articles.
19 Article 9, Law of Legislation.
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been exercised by the State Council through setting out implementation 
rules for tax statutes.20 The NPC or the SCNPC also delegates some of 
their legislative powers to the State Council. The State Council has used 
this delegated power to introduce most of the taxes in China, including 
the value-added tax (VAT), business tax, excise tax, customs duty, etc.21
At the bottom of the pyramid are the ministerial regulations 
issued by the SAT and the MoF which number more than 50. The 
“ministerial rules”, according to the Law of Legislation, refer to the rules 
that meet four criteria: (1) enacted by the SAT to implement the tax 
statutes, or administrative regulations, decisions and orders of the State 
Council; (2) passed by a ministerial session or a committee of the SAT; 
(3) promulgated by the head of the SAT in the form of an order and 
(4) published in a timely manner in the Bulletin of the State Council 
or of the SAT and nationwide via circulated newspapers.22 In addition, 
there is a vast body of informal tax rules the SAT and the MoF have 
pronounced which run into the thousands.23 These rules are not accorded 
the status of law. Previously, many of them were classified as internal and 
were restricted to use and circulation within tax agencies. But they do 
provide important guidance to taxpayers and tax agencies. Due to their 
practical importance and the increasing requirement to comply with rule 
of law principles, most such rules are now publicly available.
It is clear that the main body of the existing tax rules in China has 
been spelled out by administrative organs rather than the legislature. 
While the legislative powers have been largely delegated to others, the 
SCNPC seems to have little interest to retain the power to interpret tax 
law. Why did the SCNPC, despite the significance of the tax legislation 
to a country, grant its legislative power to administrative organs with 
few constraints? The reasons can be traced back to the early 1980s.24 At 
that time, with the economic transition and open-door policy gathering 
20 See eg Implementing Regulations of the Law on Enterprise Income Tax, promulgated under the Order 
of the State Council [2007] No. 512, 6 December 2007; Implementing Regulations of the Individual 
Income Tax Law, promulgated under the Order No. 142 of the State Council on 28 January 1994 
and most recent revision was on 19 July 2011; Implementing Regulations of the Vehicle and Vessel 
Tax Law, adopted on 23 November 2011 and came into effect on 1 January 2012.
21 See eg Interim Regulations on the Value-added Tax, promulgated under the Order No. 134 of the 
State Council on 13 December, 1993 and revised on 5 November 2008; Interim Regulations on 
Business Tax, promulgated under the Order No. 136 of the State Council on 13 December 1993 and 
revised on 5 November 2008; Provisional Regulations on Consumption Tax, promulgated under 
the Order No. 135 of the State Council on 13 December 1993 and revised on 5 November 2008.
22 Articles 74–77, Law of  Legislation, promulgated under the Order of the President [2000] No. 31 
on 15 March 2000, effective on 1 July 2000.
23 According to the rough calculation, the SAT and the MoF has issued more than 5000 informal 
tax rules. Currently, about 3000 of them are in effect.
24 See Liu Xin and Wang Lingguang, “Statutory Taxation and Legislation Reservation” (in Chinese) 
(2008) 3 Administrative Law Review 83.
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momentum, one of the daunting and urgent tasks facing the Chinese 
government was to build a legal system from scratch to meet the changing 
policies. This was a big void which could not be filled quickly. Given 
the limited competence of the legislature, the SCNPC made sweeping 
delegations of legislative powers to the State Council, and in the tax fields, 
the delegation was based on two directives.25 Under one of the directives 
(the  1985 Directive) which is still in effect today, the SCNPC gave 
blanket permission to the State Council to make rules or regulations 
regarding all tax issues relating to “reform of the economic system and 
opening to foreign countries”. The scope of this delegation was so broad 
and vague as to cover nearly every economic activity. Contrary to the 
provisions in the Law of Legislation,26 the State Council also re-delegated 
such legislative powers to its ministries to make detailed tax rules. The 
devolution of legislative powers, as such, which was originally designed 
for transitional and experimental purposes, continues to operate today.
Despite the steady enhancement of the institutional capacity within 
China’s legislature in the past three decades,27 the NPC and the SCNPC 
made very little progress to reclaim its tax legislative power. While China 
has been experiencing a new round of tax reform since 2008 and significant 
changes occurred in the rules related to VAT, business tax, real property-
related tax, resources tax, consumption tax, etc,28 none of these took place 
under the involvement of the NPC and the SCNPC. There is only one 
exception: the VVUT Law was escalated from the regulation to the statute 
level in 2011.29 The passivity of the legislative body can be partly attributed 
to the nature of tax law as being too specialized and technical to be grasped 
by the delegates of the NPC and the members of the SCNPC who lack 
25 Decision of the NPC Standing Committee to Authorize the State Council to Reform the 
System of Industrial and Commercial Taxes and Issue Relevant Draft Tax Regulations for Trial 
Application (issued on 18 September 1984 and repealed on 27 June 2009); Decision of the NPC 
on Authorizing the State Council to Formulate Interim Provisions or Regulations Concerning 
Economic Structural Reform and Open Policy (10 April 1985).
26 Under Arts 10 and 11 of the Law of Legislation, the delegation of legislative powers shall be specific 
in terms of the objective and the scope. The organ that was delegated with legislative powers shall 
not re-delegate its authority to others. The delegation of legislative powers shall be terminated 
once the matters which were governed by the delegated powers were considered appropriate to be 
subject to the enactment of statutes by the NPC and SCNPC after the test in practice.
27 For the discussion of the development of legislative system in the past 30 years, see Randall 
Peerenboom, China’s Long March towards Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 239–279.
28 B Brys et al., “Tax Policy and Tax Reform in the People’s Republic of China” (OECD Taxation 
Working Papers, No. 18, OECD Publishing, 2013).
29 Before 2011, the vehicle and vessel usage tax was subject to the administrative regulation issued 
by the State Council. See State Council, Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
on Vehicle and Vessel Tax, Order of State Council No. 482, promulgated on 29 December 2006, 
effective on 1 January 2007. This regulation was repealed in 2011 as the SCNPC issued the law 
on vehicle and vessel usage tax which was described as the first statutory codification of the rules 
of a local tax. See SCNPC, Vehicle and Vessel Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order 
of President No. 43, promulgated on 25 February 2011, effective on 1 January 2012.
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both tax knowledge and practical experience. Whatever the excuses are, it 
is hard to justify the “standstill” of the legislature for the long run. There is 
an increasing call for the legislature to take action in the tax field.30
IV. Marginal Role of Judicial Organs in the Interpretation of Tax Law
The judicial interpretation in China has two basic forms: one is the 
interpretation given by the SPC31 providing guidance for the trial of 
courts at all levels; the other is the interpretation rendered by a court 
in the adjudication of a specific case. In China, the lack of development 
of any serious case law tradition32 and the judicial mechanism internally 
inhibiting initiative and independence of judges33 makes the SPC’s 
interpretation the predominant form of judicial interpretation.34
1. SPC’s Interpretations on Tax-related Matters
The rules of an interpretative nature spelled out by the SPC are numbered 
at more than 3000.35 However, only a handful of rules are related to tax 
matters. These tax-related interpretative rules mostly address procedural 
matters or tax crimes, such as the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction,36 the 
30 See eg Liu Jianwen, “How the Tax Legislative Powers may be Returned to the NPC” 
(in Chinese), Economic Information Daily, 27 March, 2013, p 5; Yuan Mingsheng, “The Legality 
Crisis of the Tax Administrative Crisis and the Solution” (in Chinese) (2010) 1 Studies in Law 
and Business 54.
31 According to Art 5 of the Provision on the Judicial Interpretation, the interpretation issued by 
the SPC has legal effect. See SPC, Provision on the Judicial Interpretation, Fafa [2007] No. 12, 
promulgated on 9 March 2007, effective on 1 April 2007.
32 While the cases in China generally and theoretically has no binding effect, it is notable that they 
are playing a more important role nowadays since the courts, including the SPC, launched the 
practice to regularly publish “classical cases”, “exemplary cases” or “guiding cases” as the reference 
for the courts trial. See eg SPC, Circular on Release of the First Batch of Guiding Cases, Fa [2011] 
No. 354, promulgated and effective on 20 December 2011; SPC, Notice on the Top Ten Case and 
Fifty Classical Cases on the Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China’s Courts 
in 2011, Faban [2012] No. 91, promulgated and effective on 11 April 2012; Intermediate People’s 
Court of Chengdu, Measures on the Selection of the Exemplary Cases and Publication (26 June 
2005), available at http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2005/05/id/552569.shtml (in Chinese).
33 Ji Weidong, The Judicial Reform in China: The Status Quo and Future Directions (2013) 20(1) 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 189.
34 Zhou Yongkun, “The Conflict between Legal Interpretation and Government in Accordance 
with a System of Law” (in Chinese) (2006) 27 Modern Law Science 7.
35 Xin Chunying, Working Report on the Clean-up of the Judicial Interpretation addressed by 
the Sub-Committee of Legislative Affairs of the SCNPC on the second meeting of the 12th 
SCNPC, 23 April 2013.
36 For example, SPC, Reply to the High People’s Court of Jiangsu Province in Response to the 
Inquiry Regarding whether the Court shall Accept Tax Disputes Arising from the Qualification 
of Taxpayers, Faxing [2000] No. 31, promulgated and effective on 28 November 2001; SPC, 
Reply to the Inquiry Regarding whether the Court shall Accept Tax Disputes Arising from the 
Disagreement of Taxpayers on the Tax Assessment by the Tax Authority, Faxing [1992] No. 2, 
promulgated and effective on 8 January 1992.
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standing of tax offices as the administrative body,37 treatment of overdue 
tax payment under the civil laws,38 the statute of limitations,39 and tax 
fraud or evasion.40 The scarcity of the SPC interpretative rules in taxation 
as well as the SPC’s inactivity to elaborate opinions on substantive tax 
rules shows the clear intention of the SPC to distance itself from the 
potential conflicts with administrative organs by interpreting tax rules. 
Even so, the clash of the interpretations given by the SPC and the 
administrative body still occurs. The following is one example:
Under the existing laws, when a company goes bankrupt, the tax 
payment shall be given priority over the ordinary bankruptcy claim in 
the compensation regime.41 But, on whether this priority status can 
apply to the “overdue payment fee arising from the late tax payment”, 
the law is ambiguous and there are divergent views both in practice and 
academia. In Fashui [2012] No. 9,42 a reply to an inquiry from the High 
Court in Qinghai, the SPC opined that the overdue payment fee arising 
before the bankruptcy case accepted by the court falls under the “ordinary 
bankruptcy claim” whereas the fee arising after the bankruptcy case 
accepted by the court is outside the bankruptcy claim.43 In any event, the 
overdue payment fee shall not be treated on the same footing as the “tax 
37 For example, SPC, Reply to the High People’s Court of Fujian Province Regarding the Inquiry 
of the Standing of Tax Inspection Office of Local Tax Bureau as the Administrative Body, Xingta 
[1999] No. 25, promulgated and effective on 21 October 1999.
38 For example, SPC, Reply in Response to Whether the Overdue Tax Payment of the Bankrupt 
Company are Subject to the Prescribed Period of the Bankruptcy Claim under the Bankrupt Law, 
Fayan [2002] No. 11, promulgated and effective on 18 January 2002; SPC, Reply on Whether 
to Accept the Lawsuits Lodged by Tax Authorities to Determine their Creditor’s Rights to the 
Late Fees of Tax Arrears Incurred by Bankrupt Enterprises, Fashi [2012] No. 9, promulgated on 
26 June 2012, effective on 12 July 2012.
39 For example, SPC, Telephone Reply on the Statutes of Limitations in Tax Disputes, promulgated 
and effective on 27 December 1990.
40 For example, SPC, Interpretation on Some Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Laws 
in the Trial of Criminal Cases of Tax Evasion and Resistance to Pay Tax, Fashi [2002] No. 33, 
promulgated on 5 November 2002, effective on 7 November 2002; SPC, Interpretations on 
Certain Issues Relating the Application of the Decision of the SCNPC on Punishments for the 
Crime of Falsely Writing, Forging or Illegally Selling Value-added Tax Invoices, Fafa [1996] 
No. 30, promulgated on 17 October 1996.
41 According to Art 45 of the Law on Administration of the Tax Collection, unless otherwise 
provided, tax levied by tax authorities shall have priority over unsecured creditors’ claims. If a 
defaulting taxpayer is fined or is subject to confiscation for his illegal income, tax payment shall 
take priority over the fine and confiscation. Likewise, under Art 113 of the Law on Company 
Bankruptcy, tax payment precedes the ordinary creditor’s claims in the compensation order.
42 SPC, Official Reply on Whether to Accept the Lawsuits Lodged by Tax Authorities to Determine 
their Creditor’s Rights to the Late Fees of Tax Arrears Incurred by Bankrupt Enterprises, Fashi 
[2012] No. 9, promulgated on 26 June 2012, effective on 12 July 2012.
43 For the late payment fee arising after the bankruptcy case accepted by the court, the opinion in 
Fashi [2012] No. 9 echoed the provisions in an earlier SPC rules. Under Art 61(2) of Fashi [2002] 
No. 23, it is provided that the late payment fee borne by the bankrupt company after the court 
accepted the bankruptcy case does not fall under the bankruptcy claims. See SPC, Provisions on 
Issues Concerning the Hearing of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases, Fashi [2002] No. 23, Art 61(2), 
promulgated on 30 July 2002, effective on 1 September 2002.
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payment”.44 However, the SAT, in an official reply to the Guangdong 
State Tax Bureau issued in 2008 (Guoshuihan [2008] No. 1084),45 held 
that the overdue payment fee, which is different from “fines”, shall be 
treated equally as the “tax payment” and given a compensation priority. 
While the interpretations of the SPC and the SAT are both in effect, 
it adds further confusion to taxpayers concerning which rules shall be 
followed. For tax authorities, unless the case was brought to the court 
proceedings, it is predictable that they would have the natural inclination 
to follow the SAT’s interpretative rules in tax administration.
This kind of conflict is unresolved under the current law. In China, 
the courts, including the SPC, cannot exercise judicial review over the 
administrative law or the abstract administrative behaviour utilized in 
making regulations or decisions. When the courts find an administrative 
rule inconsistent with the higher laws, what they can do is to submit such a 
questionable administrative rule to the SPC which may in turn refer the case 
to the State Council.46 It is the State Council which has the final say on the 
legality of administrative interpretation. While the inconsistency or ultra vires 
of tax administrative rules was claimed by scholars to be a serious problem 
plaguing tax legislation in China,47 there seems to be no precedent where 
the SPC has ever brought a tax administrative rule to the State Council for 
review. Although the SPC can deliver its interpretation of legal norms, such 
interpretation is confined to the sphere concerning the judicial ruling. The 
lack of supremacy of judicial interpretation over administrative interpretation 
ultimately leads to conflicts and disharmony within the legal system.
2. Courts’ Interpretation in the Adjudication of Tax Cases
On the whole, the administrative litigation regime in China remains weak 
due to various context-specific factors.48 Problems seem to be more acute 
44 For the rational of the SPC in making Fashi [2012] No. 9, see Sun Youhai et al., “Understanding 
and Application of the SPC’s Reply on Whether to Accept the Lawsuits Lodged by Tax 
Authorities to Determine their Creditor’s Rights to the Late Fees of Tax Arrears Incurred by 
Bankrupt Enterprises” (in Chinese) (2012) 19 People’s Judicature 34.
45 SAT, Reply to Whether Tax Compensation Priority Includes Fines, Guoshuihan [2008] No. 1084, 
promulgated on 31 December 2008.
46 Article 53(2), Law of Administrative Litigation; Art 86, Law of Legislation.
47 See Zhang Xuebo, “Research on Legitimacy of Tax Administrative Document” (in Chinese) 
(2008) 10 Journal of South East University of Political Science and Law 34; Yan Zhiyong, 
“Theoretical Study on the Application of Tax Law” (in Chinese) (2004) 4 Finance and Tax Law 
Review 264–268.
48 These factors, which have been widely discussed in literatures, includes the interference from the 
Party and government officials, inter-court and intra-court influence, judicial corruption, a low 
level of legal consciousness among government officials and the citizenry, and the fragmentation 
and overlapping of authority that have resulted from the transition to a more market-oriented 
economy. See eg Veron Mei-Ying Hung, “China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial 
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with respect to tax litigation. The following discussion aims to review 
factors that hamper the courts from contributing to the interpretation of 
tax law.
According to China’s Statistic Yearbooks, from 1998 to 2011, the 
total number of tax cases in China was 13,419 (see Table 1). At the 
turn of the century, there was a notable increase in tax litigation which 
was soon followed by a steady decrease in the last decade. As the 
number of courts at all levels in China is around 3500,49 the number of 
tax disputes brought to the courts in the year of 2011 is only 405 which 
implies that almost 90 per cent of all courts in China did not receive 
a single tax dispute in the whole year. Moreover, as the administrative 
cases in 2011 (at the number of 136,353) account for 1.8 per cent of all 
first-instance cases accepted by courts (at the number of 7,596,116) in 
China, the percentage of tax cases among administrative cases is almost 
negligible, ie less than 0.3 per cent. Tax litigation involving foreign 
investors from cross-border transactions was even rarer. To the author’s 
knowledge, there have been only two reported cases adjudicated by 
the courts involving the application of tax treaties in the past three 
decades since China concluded its first comprehensive tax treaty on 
income and capital in 1983.50 Like most administrative litigation in 
China, more than a half of tax litigations were settled in some way as 
taxpayers withdrew the lawsuits. For those cases where the courts made 
adjudications, the majority centre on the tax procedures rather than 
the substantive rules.51
All these facts are difficult to reconcile, prima facie, with another set 
of facts: from 1994 to 2012, tax revenue in China continued to grow at 
Review: Impact on legal and Political Reform” (2004) 52(77) American Journal of Comparative 
Law 82–96; Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China” (2001) 
19 Berkeley Journal of International Law 164–178.
49 See the website of the Supreme People’s Court, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj/ 
(visited 22 July 2013).
50 China concluded its first tax treaty on income and capital with Japan in 1983. In the 
past 30 years, China’s treaty has exponentially expanded to include 99 tax treaties and 
two tax arrangements with Hong Kong and Macau. In spite of the broad treaty network, 
there are only two cases that have been reported involving the tax treaty interpretation: 
PanAmSat (2002) and Weihai (2010). See PanAmSat International Systems, Inc v Second 
Department in the External Substation of the Beijing State Tax Bureau, decided by the Higher 
People’s Court of Beijing on 20 December 2002. The verdict of the Weihai case is not 
publicly assessable, although the details of the disputes are disclosed in a SAT’s circular 
titled “International Transport Cases Involved in the Implementation of Tax Treaties by 
the Office of the State Administration of Taxation in Shandong Province”, Guoshuibanfa 
[2011] No. 34, 21 March 2011.
51 He Yan, “Administrative Interpretation of Tax Law in China: Status Quo and the 
Development” (in Chinese) (2011) 5 Journal of Heilongjiang Administrative Cadre Institute of 
Politics and Law 78.
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a startling rate of 18 per cent which is faster than the growth of GDP.54 
After the implementation of the uniform EITL, the income tax revenue 
derived from the non-resident companies increased from RMB 38.4 
billion (around USD 6.3 billion) in 2008 to RMB 117 billion (around 
USD 18.8 billion) in 2013.55 In the area of combating avoidance, tax 
authorities have become more aggressive than before. In the year of 2013, 
52 The statistic in this table for the years is based on China’s Statistic Book from 1998 and 2011. 
The statistics on the tax-related administrative cases before the year of 1998 was not recorded 
in the Statistic Books.
53 The number of cases settled in 1 year may include cases that had been accepted before that year.
54 B Brys (n 28 above), pp 3–5.
55 The statistic derives from the China’s Tax Year Book (in Chinese).
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Year
C
as
es
 a
cc
ep
te
d
C
as
es
 s
et
tl
ed
53
Different approaches tax cases were settled
A
ffi
 r
m
at
io
n 
of
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
de
ci
si
on
s
R
ev
oc
at
io
n 
of
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ru
lin
g
D
is
m
is
sa
l o
f 
th
e 
la
w
su
it
W
it
hd
ra
w
al
 o
f 
th
e 
la
w
su
it
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
O
th
er
s
2011 405 399 21 9 25 225 0 29
2010 398 402 31 14 26 245 2 84
2009 293 343 56 13 30 161 0 83
2008 334 286 61 17 33 115 1 59
2007 306 310 73 12 42 108 2 73
2006 359 356 41 27 34 173 1 80
2005 828 815 69 26 107 572 8 46
2004 1032 1041 124 70 88 338 5 416
2003 803 816 126 60 90 225 3 312
2002 1496 1482 91 73 125 733 7 453
2001 1237 1270 159 71 147 515 82 296
2000 2055 2025 157 183 164 1200 54 267
1999 1804 1930 273 195 135 1150 129 48
1998 2069 1939 96 123 140 1466 33 81
Total 13419 13414 1378 893 1186 7226 327 2327
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the tax revenue collected from anti-avoidance operations amounted to 
RMB 46.9 billion (around USD 7.6 billion), representing a year-on-year 
growth of 36 per cent over 2012 and almost a hundred times the revenue 
from the combat of avoidance in 2005.56 Against this setting, how can the 
shrinking number of litigated tax cases be properly explained?
This study argues that litigation is an unfavourable dispute resolution 
mechanism for taxpayers in China due to cultural barriers, legislative 
obstacles and institutional hindrance. It ultimately leads to the result that 
the courts largely fail to have any serious impact on the development of the 
tax law regime through any systematic case-by-case interpretation method.
a. Cultural barriers
The first tax case in China occurred in Henan Province in 1988. 
A  taxpayer claimed that the tax authorities’ decision concerning the 
identification of taxpayers was wrong.57 The appellate court upheld the 
taxpayer’s claim and the verdict was published in the SPC’s gazette. This 
case is said to have had an explosive impact on the tax administration 
nationwide, which prompted the promulgation of the administrative 
review regulation in October 1989 with the intent to avoid another 
defeat of tax agencies in judicial proceedings.58
The thinking that “losing in litigation is losing face” persists till today 
in the minds of many governmental officials. This notion can be traced to 
the Chinese legal tradition under the impacts of Confucianism. According 
to Confucian teaching, the harmonious society can be achieved if every 
Chinese person fulfils the duties assigned to him according to his social 
status. Civilians shall be (unconditionally) submissive to the governors. 
The governors, who usually take on multiple roles as a judge, a tax 
collector, a decree-maker and a general administrator, shall protect and 
take good care of the citizens like the father to the son. It is “obligations”, 
instead of “rights”, that are the basis to construct the relationship between 
the governors and the citizens.59 The stability of the social order has been 
56 Zhao Qian, “SAT: the Revenue from Anti-avoidance Operation Amounted to RMB 46.9 
Billion Last Year” (in Chinese), Economic Information Daily, 19 March 2014, available at http://
www.jjckb.cn/2014-03/19/content_496062.htm.
57 This case took place even before the enactment of the Law on Administrative Litigation in 
1990. See NPC, Law on Administrative Litigation, promulgated on 4 April 1989 and came into 
effect as of 1 October 1990.
58 Shi Xuecheng, “Resolution Mechanism on Tax Administrative Dispute” (in Chinese), PhD 
dissertation submitted to Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in 2010, available 
at http://www.cnki.com.cn.
59 See William C. Jones, “Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System”, in 
C Stephen Hsu (ed), Understanding China’s Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen 
(New York University Press, 2003) 7–46; Mo Zhang, “The Socialist Legal System with Chinese 
Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience” (2010) 24 Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal 1–64.
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maintained by three pillars which are equally important, ie Qing (human 
feelings), Li (natural justice)60 and Fa (statutory rules).61 If a governor 
fails to fulfil his role, it is very likely that he would first face a challenge 
from moral accusation (Qing and Li) instead of the risk of the legal 
responsibility (Fa).
Against this background, the core values which underpin the 
establishment of administrative litigation in the developed western 
countries are largely missing in China. Such values include the respect 
for private rights, checks and balances on public powers and the belief 
in the rule of law.62 Despite the visible development of a “rule of law” 
concept in China in the past decades, the influence of this Chinese 
cultural heritage can be commonly found in tax practice. For example, 
under the impact of the notion of “respecting officials as teachers” (yi li 
wei shi),63 taxpayers and tax lawyers tend to consult tax authorities before 
drafting the tax planning schemes or to seek clarifications on a specific 
tax term. When disputes arise, taxpayers prefer to settle problems with tax 
authorities in a private and negotiable manner to maintain the long-term, 
cooperative relationship, instead of “tearing down the face” and fighting 
for the temporary victory in court. For tax officials, the “anti-litigation” 
emotion exists since the internal evaluation of their working performance 
will be negatively affected if the officials’ administration decisions are 
challenged in courts.64 In the small likelihood that a tax dispute becomes 
the subject of court proceedings, judges are inclined to avoid adjudication 
and facilitate the reconciliation through mediation or other informal 
processes. When judges are interpreting the law, the rules spelled out by 
the tax administration, even though in an informal way and subject to 
questions on the legality, are given more weight than they deserve.
b. Legislative obstacles
Under the existing administrative litigation law, the scope that falls within 
the court’s jurisdiction is very narrow and limited to the examination of the 
validity of specific administrative conduct.65 This has two implications: first, the 
60 Li (理) is a concept found in Neo-Confucian Chinese philosophy. It refers to the underlying 
reasoning and order of nature as reflected in its organic forms.
61 Ji Weidong (n 33 above), p 206.
62 Yang Haikun and Zhu Zhongyi, “Investigation into the Stagnancy of the Administrative 
Litigation” (in Chinese) (1999) 4 Administrative Law Review 72.
63 According to the historical record, the notion of “respecting officials as teachers” was first raised 
by Li Si (280 BC–208 BC), the influential prime minister of Qin Dynasty and the representative 
of the legalist.
64 The author obtained this information from the conversations with tax officials in Fuzhou and 
Xiamen.
65 According to Art 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law, where citizens and legal persons or other 
organizations which consider the specific acts of administrative authorities or their personnel 
have infringed their lawful interests, they have the right to bring the litigation to the court.
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courts cannot hear cases brought by citizens against “abstract administrative 
conduct”, namely the creation of administrative rules, regulations, decisions 
or orders with general binding force formulated and announced by 
administrative organs.66 When the court finds a tax rule invalid or ambiguous, 
it can either ignore it in the application of law in a specific case or report it 
to the SPC which may refer the matter to the State Council. But the court 
cannot invalidate it nor make an interpretation.67 As a result, even if certain 
administrative conduct based on a tax regulation that was perceived by the 
court as invalid was rescinded, this tax regulation may remain in effect and 
continue to apply. In practice, it is quite commonplace that the courts make 
direct reference to administrative rules – even with a low and questionable 
legal status – in an adjudication without examining the legality of such 
rules.68 The prima facie harmony between administrative organs and courts 
is achieved by the latter voluntarily giving up their own limited discretion 
in reviewing or even challenging such administrative rules.
Second, it is the validity, rather than the reasonableness, of specific 
administrative conduct that may come under review by the court.69 As tax 
legislation in China is often drafted in a rather brief form using broad 
language, tax authorities have wide discretion in the implementation of 
tax rules. As a result, a wide range of tax administrative conduct, even if in 
breach of the principles of proportionality, appropriateness or necessity, as 
long as it is not illegitimate, cannot be corrected in judicial proceedings. In 
other words, only conduct which is quite clearly ultra vires can be corrected.
The other legislative obstacle was created by the Law on the 
Administration of Tax Collection. Under Art 88 of this Law, for 
tax disputes70 other than those arising from sanction decisions or 
66 See eg Art 12 of Administrative Litigation Law; Art 3, SPC, Interpretations of Certain Issues in 
the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law, Fashi [2000] No. 8, promulgated on 
8 March 2000, effective on 10 March 2000.
67 Article 53(2), Law on the Administrative Litigation.
68 The existing law provides the basis for the courts to make reference to the rules and regulations 
promulgated by ministries of the State Council. However, the precondition is that such rules and 
regulations are valid and formulated in accordance with the higher law. See Art 53(1) of Law 
on the Administrative Litigation; Art 62(2), SPC, Fashi [2000] No. 8. The observation that, 
in practice, courts often do not review the legality of the administrative rules before making 
reference, is supported by a judge who once worked at the SPC; see Huang Songyou, “Power of 
Judicial Interpretation: Logic and Construction” (in Chinese) (2005) 2 China Legal Science 10.
69 According to Art 56 of Fashi [2008] No. 8, when the plaintiff brought to the court specific 
administrative conduct which is legitimate but subject to the question of the reasonableness, 
the court shall reject the lawsuit.
70 According to Art 100 of the Implementation Rules of the Law on the Administration of Tax 
Collection, the “dispute over tax payment” (nashuizhengyi) as mentioned in Art 88 of the 
Law on the Administration of Tax Collection refers to the dispute arising from the taxpayer, 
tax withholding agent or tax payment guarantor over such specific administrative acts by tax 
authorities as determining the subject of tax payment, target of tax collection, scope of tax 
collection, tax reduction and exemption, tax refund, applicable tax rate, base of tax assessment, 
stages of tax payment, period and place of tax payment and means of tax levying.
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enforcement measures of tax authorities, taxpayers are required to 
fulfil two conditions before launching any litigation: first, pay or remit 
the tax and the overdue fine according to the decision made by the 
tax authority, or provide the corresponding guaranty; and then, go 
through the procedures of administrative review. It is only when the 
taxpayers disagree with the decision of the administrative review panel 
that the judicial remedies become available.71 This arrangement makes 
the journey of taxpayers to pursue judicial remedies not only long and 
thorny, but also economically costly. If taxpayers have the alternative to 
negotiate a reduced tax payment with tax authorities, they would rather 
not initiate judicial proceedings.72
There are some noteworthy legislative movements. On 7 June 2013, 
the State Council released on its website a revised draft on the Law 
on the Administration of Tax Collection for public comment.73 On 
23 December 2013, a revised draft of the Law on Administrative 
Litigation was submitted to the SCNPC in the sixth meeting for 
deliberation. One of the key issues under discussion is to enlarge the 
scope of the courts’ jurisdiction on administrative cases.74 Will this 
ongoing movement clear up the legislative obstacles in the way of 
courts to be actively involved in the resolution of tax disputes? The 
answer is “yes and no”. The “yes” stems from the optimistic hope that 
the coming reform in the administration litigation regime may unleash 
the initiative of judges and enhance the courts’ independence in the 
exercise of judicial review of administrative conduct. The “no” is based 
on the reality that Art 88 of the Law on the Administration of Tax 
Collection, despite the severe criticism it has received, remains almost 
intact in the revised draft. A cloud of uncertainties still remains with 
the revision of these two laws. It will take time to see the impact of 
these legislative changes on tax litigation.
71 The rational to make the administrative review a prerequisite for judicial proceedings is based 
on the assumptions that tax authorities would be at a better position to evaluate the tax-related 
administrative acts. It is conducive to the continuity and uniformity of decision-making process 
by tax authorities, whereas the caseload of the court can be effectively reduced. See Gu Guoxian, 
“Reflection and Perfection of the Existing Tax Litigation Mechanism” (in Chinese) (2006) 
11(2) Journal of Taxation College of Yangzhou University 37; Wang Hongmao, “An Analysis on 
the Defect in China’s Tax Administrative Procedural System” (in Chinese) (2009) 290(7) 
Taxation Research 45.
72 See Wei Cui, “What is ‘Law’ in Chinese Tax Administration” (2011) 19(1) Asia Pacific Law 
Review 86.
73 The draft version of revised Law (24 Aug 2013), available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/
article/cazjgg/201306/20130600387820.shtml (visited 24 Aug 2013). The deadline for the 
public solicitation is July 2013.
74 Sun Ying, “China Launched the Revision of the Law on Administrative Litigation” 
(23  December 2013), available at http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2013/12-23/5649507.shtml 
(visited 13 Jan 2014).
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c. Institutional hindrance
“Are judges in China competent to adjudicate tax cases?” This is a 
common concern among taxpayers, tax practitioners, tax authorities and 
tax law educators in China.75 In the countries where there are special tax 
courts, judges admitted to tax courts normally have tax expertise acquired 
from prior practice experience, government service or a combination of 
both. Their experience, either representing taxpayers in tax planning as 
well as tax controversies or serving at public organs in drafting tax policy 
and participating in litigation, enables them to take an objective and 
independent view of the issues to be decided.76
This is not the case in China. Since there is no specialized tax court, 
the disputes that taxpayers launch against tax authorities are brought to 
the administrative chambers (xingzheng shenpan ting) of the court. Judges 
at courts are normally required to pass the civil service test and the bar 
examination. Neither of these examinations gives any consideration 
to tax expertise or knowledge of the candidates. In the law schools of 
universities which send thousands of graduates to the court system, the 
courses on tax law have been, in the long term, placed in a marginal 
position in the curriculum and are offered as optional courses. It is thus 
not a surprise that there is a severe lack of tax knowledge and expertise 
among judges. The ramifications of that are imaginable: judges who are 
uncertain of their competence in handling tax issues are inclined to take 
the opinions of tax authorities as authoritative, and in some extreme 
cases, even consult tax authorities at a higher level for suggestions before 
making decisions. The discretion of courts granted by the law to review 
the validity of the regulations issued by the SAT and the MoF only exists 
in name and has rarely been exercised. Even if occasionally judges render 
opinions on a certain provision of tax law, their interpretations more 
often invite criticism and questioning from tax professionals, rather 
than affirmation.77 To play safe, many of the verdicts in tax cases are 
written in an extremely brief and concise manner in which the deductive 
process and the logical analysis are left unstated, and the application 
of the law is reduced to the mere mention of the name of the law and 
75 See eg Li Jin, “Teaching Taxation Law in China” (2008) 62(5) Bulletin for International Taxation 
183–190.
76 David Laro, “The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal” (1995) 1(17) 
University of Illinois Law Review 24.
77 For instance, in the PanAmSat case in which the Beijing High People’s Court disregarded two 
SAT informal rules regarding the characterization of income arising from the lease of satellites 
and directly applied the tax statute and the tax treaty as the legal basis, tax scholars raise 
questions concerning the way the Court interpreted the US–China tax treaty. See eg Chen 
Yanzhong, Interpretation Issues of International Tax Treaties: A Preliminary Study (in Chinese) 
(Beijing: Science Press, 2010) 4.
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the provisions.78 In the author’s opinion, this lack of tax competence in 
judges in handling tax disputes is one of the most fundamental causes 
leading to the reduction of judicial impacts in the tax arena.
V.  Administrative Interpretation: The Leading Force in Tax Law 
Interpretation and Policy Development
In China, the administrative interpretation in tax law is carried out by 
the State Council and four of its ministries, namely the SAT, the MoF, 
the General Administration of Customs (GAC)79 and the Customs 
Tariff Policy Commission (CTPC).80 As the GAC and the CTPC are 
specifically responsible for the formulation and development of tax rules 
on customs, the SAT and the MoF take the responsibilities to interpret a 
wide range of tax laws except for customs.
1. State Council’s Interpretation on Tax Law
There are two ways that the State Council interprets tax law. First, it 
promulgates implementation rules of tax statutes to set out detailed 
operational rules. Given the scarcity of the existing tax statutes as well as 
their excessive generality and vagueness in content, these implementation 
rules are often an extension of legislative activities, rather than mere 
interpretation. Next, the State Council also interprets administration 
regulations issued by it when clarification or supplementary provisions 
to such regulations are needed, or when ministries or governments at the 
provincial level encounter difficulties in giving interpretations or bring 
up different interpretations during the course of application.81 In practice, 
the interpretation falling under the latter category is very rare.82
78 In dozens of tax judgments the author has read, most of them follow a monotonous pattern which 
did not elaborate on the rational in the application of the law. The understatement of verdicts is 
a common problem that exists in China’s judicial system. See Wei Shengqiang, “Some Thoughts 
on the Improvement of China’s Court Decisions” (in Chinese) (2012) 5 Science of Law 75.
79 The GAC is at the same level as the SAT and MoF in terms of legislative power. It is responsible 
for studying and drafting regulations on customs administration and the detailed rules for the 
implementation for such regulations.
80 For the powers of the Customs Tariff Commission on the law interpretation, the following notice 
from the State Council provides the description: Power of the Customs Tariff Commission of 
the State Council to Interpret the Regulation of on Import and Export Duties, Shuiweihui [2004] 
No. 10, 5 July 2004.
81 General office of State Council, Notice on the Power and Procedures on the Interpretation of 
Administrative Regulations, Guobanfa [1999] No. 43, 10 May 1999.
82 One example is Guobanhan [2004] No. 23 in which the general office of the State Council 
responded to the SAT’s inquiry concerning the interpretation of the term “collection and 
management” in Art 5 under the Interim Regulations on the Urban Maintenance and 
Construction Tax.
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2.  Highly Centralized Powers of SAT and MoF to Interpret Tax Law 
and Relevant Problems
Given the limited participation of the State Council, the predominant 
task to interpret tax law actually falls upon the shoulders of two ministries, 
the SAT and the MoF. They are in charge of drafting tax statutes and 
implementation rules, providing ministerial regulations on tax issues and 
giving interpretation to the existing tax law. In the absence of effective 
legislative guidance and judicial checks, the high centralization of powers 
with the SAT and the MoF to legislate, interpret and administer tax law 
is very likely to lead to arbitrariness and disorder in the rule-making. 
Problems can be manifested in multiple ways:
 (1) the interpretative work undertaken by the SAT and/or the MoF 
is so closely interwoven with the legislative powers that the line 
between the two is blurred;
 (2) ultra vires or inconsistent interpretations that deprive taxpayers 
of rights under the higher law are rampant;
 (3) retrospective application of these informal rules and flaws in 
the formality add further doubts about the legal effect of such 
rules and
 (4) ultimately, taxpayers are put at a vulnerable and disadvantageous 
position facing the frequent and non-transparent changes of 
tax rules without effective channels to challenge the legality of 
such rules.
The interpretation of anti-avoidance rules in the EITL is an example to 
illustrate these problems. The EITL is one of the four tax statutes passed 
by the legislature in China, and the anti-avoidance rules are provided 
in Chapter 6 (Arts 41–48), namely “the special tax adjustment”. These 
eight provisions, no more than a half page in length, lay down the 
skeleton of the anti-avoidance rules, whereas the flesh is filled in by the 
Implementation Rules of the EITL promulgated by the State Council 
together with a collection of rules issued by the SAT (or jointly with 
the MoF). The list of the SAT rules with an anti-avoidance function is 
expansive and open ended.83 Very often, these SAT rules go far beyond 
mere interpretation, and set down the basic rules which materially affect 
83 For example, SAT, Circular on the Implementing Measures for Special Tax Adjustments 
(Trial  Implementation), Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2, promulgated on 8 January 2009, effective 
on 1 January 2008; SAT, Notice on the Internal Implementation Regulations on Special Tax 
Adjustments, Guoshuifa [2012] No. 13, promulgated on 10 February 2012, effective on 1 March 
2012; SAT, Notice on the Procedural Guidelines for Joint Review of Significant Special Tax 
Adjustments Cases (Trial), Guoshuifa [2012] No. 16, promulgated on 16 February 2012, effective 
on 1 March 2012.
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taxpayers’ rights and obligations. Certain anti-avoidance articles of the 
EITL would have been non-implementable without the SAT rules.84 Some 
of the SAT rules were promulgated with retrospective effect.85 On other 
occasions, the SAT took a bold leap to go beyond the literal meaning of 
the articles in the EITL, and expanded tax jurisdiction to capture revenue 
which has an “indirect link” with China.86 While the meaning of “lack 
of reasonable business objective” under the general anti-avoidance rule 
(GAAR) in Art 47 of the EITL is ambiguous,87 in practice, tax agencies 
tend to take a simplistic approach to equate this expression with the fact 
that a taxpayer derives tax benefits. The question of whether the primary 
purpose of the transactions is really tax oriented or just tax related is 
too often disregarded by tax agencies. Due to the lack of involvement 
of a neutral third party like courts, in some situations, taxpayers have 
to compromise and accept decisions made by tax authorities based on 
various considerations.
3. Reform on the Way
A reform has begun, not in any radical way, but using a progressive and 
piecemeal approach to bring gradual and visible adjustments to the existing 
tax system. This reform has taken place within the wider setting of the 
restructure of the administrative law in China at the turn of the century 
84 For example, Circular No. 121 [2008] provides the fixed ratio on the deductible interest under 
thin capitalization rules. See SAT and MoF, Circular on Tax Policy Issues Relating to Deduction 
of Interest Paid by Enterprises to Affiliated Parties, Caishui [2008] No. 121, promulgated and 
effective on 23 September 2008.
85 For instance, Art 10 of Circular [2009] No. 59 is a provision with the anti-avoidance function 
which allows tax authorities to treat transactions involving assets or equities within 12 months 
before or after a reorganization as a single transaction based on the “substance over form” 
principle. This circular has a retrospective application effect. See MoF and SAT, Notice on 
Enterprise Income Tax Treatment of Enterprise Reorganizations, Caishui [2009] No. 59, 
promulgated on 30 April 2009, effective on 1 January 2008.
86 For example, Arts 5 and 6 of Circular [2009] No. 698 provides that capital gains derived by a 
non-resident company from indirect disposition of shares in Chinese companies may be taxed 
in China if the intermediary company has no business substance and can be “looked through”. 
These provisions are in conflict with the sourcing rules in the Implementation Rules of ETIL 
(Art 7), which provides the capital gains from the disposition of shares are sourced in the 
country where the investee company is. See SAT, Tax Issues for Equity Transfers by Non-China 
Tax Resident Enterprises, Circular [2009] No. 698, promulgated on 15 December 2009, effective 
on 1 January 2008.
87 Under the GAAR (Art 47) of the ETIL, when the companies arrange transactions without 
reasonable business objectives to reduce taxable income, tax agencies are entitled to make 
readjustments in a reasonable manner. But as to what constitutes the “lack of reasonable business 
objectives”, the existing rules have not elaborated. In the para 39 of SAT Circular [2008] No. 159, 
three elements are provided to identify a transaction “for lacking the reasonable commercial 
purpose”, namely an artificial scheme, tax benefits and the primary purpose of the transaction to 
reap tax benefits. But the meaning for each element is still unclear. According to Art 120 of the 
Implementation Rules to the ETIL, “lack of reasonable business objectives” is generally described 
as taxpayers having a primary purpose to reduce, waive or postpone tax payments.
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which was driven by a combination of objectives: the needs of the market 
economy, the integration into the globalized world and the pursuit of the 
rule of law. The hallmark of this administrative law overhaul is the decision 
promulgated by the State Council in 1999 entitled the “Comprehensive 
Promotion of the Administration in Accordance with Law”.88 In the 
following decade, the State Council provided a series of regulations, policy 
statements and implementation outlines to translate the abstract notion of 
“administration in accordance with law” into concrete measures and actions. 
These include regulating procedures on the enactment of administrative 
regulations and rules, establishing the review system to check the legitimacy 
of existing administrative regulations and rules, designing rules to curb 
the arbitrary use of administrative discretion, providing channels for the 
governmental information access and building up the accountability 
system for officials.89 A general theme under this movement is to rein in the 
bureaucracy and give more weight to the protection of individual rights.
The SAT, following the lead of the State Council, brought the reform 
to the tax area. This reform has been carried out from top to bottom in 
tax administration system since 2000. It was accelerated in recent years as 
the SAT has increased the pace to bring forward new regulations, rules or 
internal documents on tax procedural rules and to make frequent revisions 
on the old rules. The efforts made by the SAT and its accomplishments 
are rather impressive. They include the following examples (2009–2014):
 (1) In SAT Order [2010] No. 20,90 the new measure on the enactment 
of tax normative rules was promulgated in the form of ministerial 
regulation. It requires public solicitation and transparency in the 
formulation of tax rules, reinforces the general principle of non-
retrospective application and introduces a review mechanism 
on the legitimacy of existing rules.
 (2) Based on SAT Order [2010] No. 21,91 the regulation on tax 
administrative review was systematically revised. It provides 
88 State Council, Comprehensive Promotion of the Administration in accordance with Law, 
promulgated on 15 March 1999. This official document was issued to echo the amendment 
of the Constitution in March 1999 which provides in Art 5 that China shall pursue the 
administration in accordance with law.
89 See Shen Kui, “Administrative Self-regulation and Rule of Administrative Law: A Preliminary 
Investigation” (2011) 3 Administrative Law Research 34–37.
90 This new measure was issued to replace its predecessor, Guoshuifa [2005] No. 201 which 
was in the form of informal tax rules. For comparison, see SAT, Administrative Measures for 
Formulating Normative Documents in Taxation (for Trial Implementation), Guoshuifa [2005] 
No. 201, effective on 1 March 2006 and repealed on 1 July 2010; SAT, the Administrative 
Measures for Formulating Normative Documents in Taxation, Order No. 20, promulgated on 
10 February 2010 and effective on 1 July 2010.
91 SAT, Rules on Taxation Administrative Review, Order No. 21, promulgated on 10 February 
2010 and effective on 1 April 2010.
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more sophisticated rules on evidence, grants taxpayers broader 
access to participate in the review proceedings and strengthens 
supervision of the conduct of tax authorities. In October 2012, 
the administrative review panel of the SAT was established. 
This panel can participate in the review proceedings and 
provide suggestion for settlement when the cases involve 
major and difficult tax issues. One third of the panel (8/24) is 
comprised of tax professionals from academia, accounting firms 
and law firms.92
 (3) Guoshuifa [2012] No. 9293 provides new rules to standardize the 
usage of titles and formats in tax official documents.
 (4) Guoshuifa [2012] No. 6594 provides instructions to curb the 
abusive use of administrative discretion.
 (5) In February 2014, the SAT issued a notice which mandates 
public solicitation as a prerequisite step before the promulgation 
of ministerial regulations and tax normative rules.95
 (6) Quite a few regulations have been issued from 2009 to 2013 
on the protection of taxpayers’ interest and redefining the 
role of tax administration as a service-oriented organ. These 
regulations aim to strike a balance between governmental 
efficiency and respect for individual rights.96
Against this setting, the rules on how the tax administration should 
interpret the tax law are gradually taking shape. In general, the SAT’s 
interpretive powers are exercised in two scenarios: first, the SAT can 
interpret tax-related administrative regulations enacted by the State 
Council.97 Alternatively, the SAT may interpret the tax normative rules 
enacted by it. The “normative rules”, as defined in SAT Order [2010] 
No. 20, refer to those rules bearing the following three features: (1) being 
92 For the composition of the penal, available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/
n9947993/n9948049/12159165.html (visited 23 Dec 2013).
93 SAT, Notice on the Standards of Official Documents in National Tax Administrative Organs, 
Guoshuifa [2012] No. 92, promulgated on 10 October 2012.
94 SAT, Guidance on Regulating Tax Administrative Discretion, Guoshuifa [2012] No. 65, 
promulgated on 3 July 2012.
95 SAT General Office, “The SAT Mandates the Public Solicitation as a Prerequisite Condition 
before the Promulgation of Tax Rules” (in Chinese) (28 February 2014), available at http://
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n2735/n2834/n2835/c664081/content.html (visited 4 Mar 2014).
96 See eg SAT, Bulletin on the Rights and Obligations of Taxpayers, Bulletin [2009] No. 1, 
promulgated on 6 November 2009; SAT, Several Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of 
Taxpayers’ Rights, Shuizongfa [2013] No. 15, promulgated on 9 February 2013; SAT, Notice on 
the transition of the functions (of tax administration) and improvements of service, Shuizongfa 
[2013] No. 74, promulgated on 12 July 2013.
97 General office of State Council, Notice on the Power and Procedures on the Interpretation of 
Administrative Regulations, Guobanfa [1999] No. 43, 10 May 1999.
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made and promulgated by tax agencies at and above the county level; 
(2) which prescribe the rights and obligations of taxpayers, withholding 
agents and other parties against whom tax administrative actions may 
be taken and (3) which have general binding force and are applicable 
repeatedly within the jurisdiction of the tax agency.
The interpretation of the tax law made by the SAT is generally 
pronounced under three forms: bulletin (gonggao), opinion (yijian) and 
reply (pifu). The bulletin is applied to announce important or legal 
matters domestically and abroad on tax issues and shall be promulgated in 
public. The opinion is used to convey the opinions of tax authorities on 
important tax matters under the format of the letter (han). Both bulletins 
and opinions are normative rules and their enactment shall comply 
with the procedures under the SAT Order [2010] No. 20. Whenever a 
taxpayer finds the interpretation made by the SAT in the form of bulletin 
or opinion inconsistent with the superior laws, he may apply to the SAT 
to conduct a review on the legitimacy of such rules without entering 
into administrative review procedures or administrative litigation.98 
In contrast, the reply does not constitute a normative rule. It is used to 
address a specific inquiry from local tax authorities arising from a certain 
situation and theoretically has effect only in that particular case.99
4.  Interrelation Between the SAT and Local Tax Agencies 
on the Interpretation of Tax Law
After the 1994 fiscal reform, China established the bifurcated system of 
tax administration which included state tax bureaus (guo shui) and local 
tax bureaus (di shui). Local tax agencies, in this context, refer to state tax 
bureaus and local tax bureaus at the provincial, municipal and county 
levels. They are all subordinate to the tax policy and technical guidance 
set out by the SAT.
According to Art 20 of SAT Order [2010] No. 20, the power to 
interpret tax normative rules exclusively belongs to the agency which 
enacted the rules. In other words, local tax agencies cannot interpret 
rules enacted by the SAT but merely apply them. However, a practical 
issue arises: as the application and interpretation of the law are mostly 
intertwined, how can it be ensured that the work of local tax agencies is 
minimized to the mechanical use of the SAT rules, instead of producing 
“creative applications”? To address this concern, one of the ways adopted 
98 Article 35, SAT Order No. 20, 2010.
99 See eg SAT Official Reply to Issues Concerning Levying of Land Appreciation Tax on Above-
ground Structures, Guoshuihan [2010] No. 347, promulgated on 26 July 2010.
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by the SAT to curtail the discretion of local tax agencies is to make the 
meaning of the rules more self-evident and easier to implement. Some 
practical strategies100 have been used in this regard:
 (1) to illuminate the meaning of an undefined term or to add clarity 
to certain abstract concepts, the SAT tends to provide a list of 
factors so that tax authorities can complete an overall analysis 
based on the facts of each case;101
 (2) the rulings reported from local agencies are published by 
the SAT on a selective basis to indicate the endorsement 
from the  top echelon and to serve as the examples for other 
agencies102 and
 (3) when tax rules are promulgated, the SAT issues the commentary 
simultaneously to explain the background and the aims of new 
rules as well as key points in the implementation.103
In addition, local tax agencies are directed to consult the SAT for 
instructions and guidance (qingshi) whenever they encounter uncertainties 
and ambiguities in the application of the SAT rules in a specific scenario. 
The SAT may address the inquiry either in the form of an opinion,104 
which has general binding force and can be used repeatedly by tax 
agencies, or in the form of a reply,105 which has effect only on that specific 
case. This mechanism of consultation for instructions is widely used by 
local tax agencies as a protective umbrella since, if the actions of tax 
agencies have been endorsed by the SAT, tax agencies can more easily 
100 These strategies are provided in the technical guidance the SAT sent out to local agents, see 
eg SAT, Guidance on Regulating Tax Administrative Discretion, Guoshuifa [2012] No.  65, 
promulgated on 3 July 2012; SAT, Several Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of 
Taxpayers’ Rights, Shuizongfa [2013] No. 15, promulgated on 9 February 2013.
101 For instance, to clarify the meaning “beneficial ownership”, in Circular [2009] No. 601, the 
SAT provided a list of seven adverse factors based on which the taxpayers may be denied as the 
beneficial owner of the income. See SAT, Notice on How to Understand and Determine the 
“Beneficial Owners” in Tax Treaties, Circular [2009] No. 601, promulgated and effective on 
27 October 2009.
102 See eg SAT, Notice on Correctly Dealing with Treaty Abuse Case regarding the Xinjiang Anti-
Treaty Shopping case, Guoshuihan [2008] No. 1076, promulgated on 30 December 2008; SAT, 
Notice on International Transport Cases Involved in the Implementation of Tax Treaties by 
the Office of the SAT in Shandong Province, Guoshuibanfa [2011] No. 34, promulgated on 
21 March 2011.
103 To some degree, these official commentaries may be construed as the legislative documents and 
supplementary materials to facilitate the understanding of tax rules. They formed an integral 
part for tax authorities to read and apply new tax rules.
104 See eg SAT, Opinions on the Cases Involving Beneficial Ownership Raised by Hubei, Other 
Provinces and Cities concerning the Dividend Provision under the Tax Arrangement between 
the Mainland and Hong Kong, Guoshuihan [2013] No. 165, promulgated and effective on 
12 April 2013.
105 See eg SAT, Reply on Matters Relating to Wal-Mart’s Acquisition of the Equity of Trust-Mart, 
Shuizonghan [2013] No. 82, promulgated and effective on 21 February 2013.
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withstand any possible court challenge and be shielded from the official 
risks of making mistakes in their decisions.
Local tax agencies, however, are not puppets. Although the SAT has 
exerted increasing influence and supervision on local agencies regarding 
the application of tax law, there are vast areas out of its reach. The majority 
of tax rulings that are neither reported to the upper offices nor disclosed 
to the public are kept confidential between taxpayers and agencies. 
The non-transparency of the bargaining process, the complicated 
considerations on relationships and the “thin culture of legality” among 
tax officials cast serious doubt on whether local tax authorities indeed 
constrain the activities to the mere application of law. Such concerns 
are reinforced by reading some of the rulings reported in the press. These 
reported rulings are the one-sided stories told by agencies and published 
on the China Taxation News, an official newspaper run by the SAT. 
They usually contain a brief description of facts and a large body of text 
depicting actions taken by agencies to capture tax revenue. Meanwhile, 
the legal reasoning of the agency’s decision, the taxpayers’ propositions 
and the negotiation process are simply left out or played down. It occurs 
from time to time that the decisions of tax agencies clearly deviate from 
the literal meaning of tax rules or constitute the interpretative activities 
prohibited by the SAT rules.106 Such problems can hardly be rectified 
unless the SAT takes notice and issues new circulars to give clarifications.
VI.  Moving towards the Rule of Law in the 
Interpretation of Tax Law
The rule of law is generally considered to contain the following core 
elements: the government is bound by the law and not above it; laws 
are fairly and transparently made; laws are publicly and readily accessible 
without retrospective application and laws are generally acceptable to 
106 For example, Chongqing State Tax Bureau published one of its ruling made in 2011 which 
recharacterized a service payment paid from a Chinese company to a Hong Kong company as 
the dividends. In that case, the Hong Kong company provided service to the Chinese company 
for the development of the environmental protection project and took the responsibility to find 
potential overseas buyers for the Chinese company. Despite the fact that Hong Kong company 
did not hold any shares in the Chinese company, the Chongqing State Tax Bureau decided 
that the payment from the Chinese company to the Hong Kong company constitute dividends, 
rather than service income, since Hong Kong company shares the risk in this environment 
protection project. The recharacterization of income as such cannot find the explicit basis under 
the existing tax rules, except for the abstract doctrine of “substance over form”. See International 
Tax Administration of Chongqing State Tax Bureau, Case study of the CERs project (17 May 
2013), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/a788ec2cb4daa58da0114aab.html (visited 17 
May 2013); Alex Duan, “Income from Sale of Carbon Credits Is Taxable Dividend, Chinese Tax 
Authority Says”, Taxanalysts: Worldwide Tax Daily, 16 November 2011.
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those to whom they apply.107 Despite the positive signals drawn from 
the SAT’s self-restraint in their legal interpretative activities, the main 
blocks hindering the implementation of the rule of law in the tax field 
still remain in place as the monopoly status of administrative organs to 
legislate, interpret and administer tax law has not been fundamentally 
changed. While the judiciary in China is and may continue to remain 
feeble in the tax field, this part identifies other possible routes by which 
the interpretation of tax law carried out by administrative organs can 
move closer to the basic requirements of the rule of law under the impact 
of external checks and supervision.
1. Restoration of Tax Legislative Powers to the Legislature
The high centralization of legislative and interpretative powers 
vested in administrative organs is the root cause of many problems in 
the interpretation of tax law, including ultra vires interpretations and 
inconsistencies among the rules. To address such problems, the first step 
is for the legislature to reclaim its tax legislative powers provided under 
the Law of Legislation. While this proposition has been called for in 
academia for a long time, the legislature did not take any public action 
until very recently. In March 2013, during the 12th Meeting of the NPC, 
a motion, initiated by a delegate from Shandong and gathering support 
of more than 30 delegates within a day, was submitted to the Legislative 
Affairs Commission of the NPC. It asked for the power of tax legislation, 
currently retained by the State Council, to be returned to the NPC and 
the SCNPC.108 In early July 2013, the budgetary affairs commission 
of SCNPC made a preliminary official response to this motion, 
acknowledging the unsatisfactory status of tax legislation in China. 
This response, however, did not give a definite answer on whether the 
1985 Directive – under which the sweeping delegation of tax legislative 
powers was made – will be terminated and how the interpretative power 
will be restored by the NPC.109
At the third Plenum of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) held in November 2013, the principle of “taxation according 
107 For the discussion of how the rule of law originated and has meant according to different 
theories, see Richard Cullen, The Rule of Law in Hong Kong, July 2005, available at http://
civic-exchange.org/en/live/upload/files/200507_RuleofLaw.pdf (visited 9 Jan 2014).
108 Li Qiaoyi, “NPC Proposal Aims to Challenge State Council Tax Powers” (9 March, 2013), available 
at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/766904.shtml#.UfHM4Y2nr6M (visited 22 July 2013).
109 Yin Liang, “The NPC Endorsed the Motion on the Reclamation of Tax Legislative Power by the 
NPC” (in Chinese), Beijing Times, 4 July 2013, available at http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2013/07/04/2
225s4169691.htm (visited 22 July 2013).
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to the law” (shui shou fa ding) appears, for the first time, in the report of 
the CCP which hammers out the country’s broad economic agenda for the 
next decade. It has been incorporated among the measures to improve the 
NPC mechanism.110 The essence of this principle, as widely recognized by 
scholars in China,111 requires the government to levy tax based on laws 
passed by the legislature. In other words, citizens can refuse to pay tax if 
there is no explicit provision under the tax law. This sends a strong signal 
that the legislature in China will play a more active role in the tax field 
in the years to come, which can scale down the broad powers enjoyed by 
administrative organs to both legislate and interpret tax law.
2.  Increasing Supervision from Civilians, Tax Professionals 
and Non-governmental Entities
There has been a general awakening of awareness among Chinese citizens 
on their “rights as taxpayers” in recent years. This has happened within the 
larger context as people in China are gaining an increasing consciousness 
of private property rights and seeking further protection of these rights.112 
It has also been affected by some particular events such as:
 (1) In 2009, China was ranked at the second place in Forbes Tax 
Misery Index which indicates that China is among countries 
with the heaviest tax burden in the world. It aroused a fierce 
discussion nationwide on the justification of taxation in 
China and the increasing demand for the transparency of the 
governments’ budget;
 (2) In 2007, a non-governmental organization called “Transition 
Research Institute” (chuan zhi xing) was established. One of 
their aims is to promote the awareness of taxpayers’ rights 
among civilians by publishing annual reports on tax matters in 
China that are publicly and freely downloadable;113
110 CPC Central Committee, Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening 
Reforms adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, issued on 
12 November 2013.
111 See eg Tan Youtu et al., “The Theory of Taxing According to Law” (in Chinese), (2000) 
3  Modern Law Science 76; Zhang Shouwen, “The Principle of Taxing According to Law” 
(in Chinese) (1996) 6 Chinese Journal of Law 34; Wang Hongmao, “Review on the Principle of 
Taxing According to Law” (in Chinese) (2004) 3 Law Review 56.
112 Mo Zhang, “From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the 
Protection of Property Rights in China” (2008) 5 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 317, 322.
113 From 2007 to 2011, the Transition Institute published four reports and a book on taxpayers’ 
rights. These reports are given the sub-titles such as “the Truth of Taxation” (2007), “Say 
No to Plunder, Start from Tax” (2008), “Pursuing the Transparent Fiscal System” (2009), 
“Double Taxation” (2011). These reports written in Chinese can be downloaded at http://www.
zhuanxing.cn/html/tax/index.html (visited 13 Jan 2014).
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 (3) In May 2008, the Provision on the Publication of Governmental 
Information114 came into effect providing a legal basis for citizens 
to seek particular information from governments. Since then, 
some citizens have taken the initiative to ask governments to 
publicize financial budgets and a few of them received positive 
feedback.115
The growing civil society force exerts a noticeable impact on the 
interpretation of tax law made by administrative organs. In December 
2009, 24 foundations collaborated to submit a letter to the State Council 
to request a review on the legality of two notices issued by the SAT and 
the MoF, namely Caishui [2009] No. 122 and Caishui [2009] No. 123.116 
A pivotal issue was whether the interpretation of the term “qualified 
non-profit organizations (NPO)” under the EITL given by the MoF and 
the SAT was contrary to the EITL and its implementation rules.117 This 
event is noted as “one of the top ten events signalling the civilization 
development” in China in 2009. In February 2011, 13 tax professors from 
renowned universities submitted a jointly signed letter to the SCNPC 
questioning the legitimacy of the State Council’s decision to allow some 
cities to launch the house property tax reform. This decision was said 
to contradict with the existing provision of the real property tax.118 
The supervision from outsiders on the interpretative activities of tax 
authorities is reinforced by the release of the SAT Order [2010] No. 20. 
114 State Council, Provision on the Publication of Governmental Information, State Council 
Order No. 492, promulgated on 5 April 2007, effective on 1 May 2008.
115 For example, according to the stories told by Mr. Wu Junliang, a CEO of a private company in 
Shenzhen, he has submitted inquiries to the governments of different cities since 2007 asking 
for the publication of financial budgets. Only a few of them made positive replies. For instance, 
Shenzhen Municipal Government allowed Mr. Wu to read financial budgets of the year in 
2008 in paper and Guangzhou Municipal Government published their local budgets on line. 
See http://www.globalpeople.com.cn/index.php/news/society/3860 (visited 13 Jan 2014).
116 MoF and SAT, Notice on the Issues Concerning Tax-exempt Income of Non-profit 
Organizations With Respect to Enterprise Income Tax, Caishui [2009] No. 122, promulgated on 
11 November 2009, effective on 1 January 2008; MoF and SAT, The Circular on Management 
Issues Concerning the Eligibility of Non-profitable Organization for Tax Exemption, Caishui 
[2009] No. 123, promulgated on 11 November 2009, effective on 1 January 2008. It is noted 
that Caishui [2009] No. 123 has been repealed by Caishui [2014] No. 13. Compared with Caishui 
[2009] No. 123, Caishui [2014] No. 13 enlarges the scope of “qualified non-profit organizations” 
by removing the condition that the major activities of the NPO shall be carried out in China. 
Other than that, the main context of Caishui [2009] No. 123 remains untouched. This minor 
change seemingly has not yet responded adequately to the opposition raised by these foundations. 
See MoF and SAT, The Circular on Management Issues Concerning the Eligibility of Non-
profitable Organization for Tax Exemption, Caishui [2014] No. 13, promulgated on 29 January 
2014, effective on 1 January 2013.
117 Xiong Wei, Zhu Yansheng, Yang Xiaoqiang, et al., “The Meaning and Inspiration of the 
Questioning Raised by Taxpayers on the Legality of the Tax Normative Rules” (in Chinese) 
(2010) 1 Tax Law and Case Review 1–22.
118 For the participating professors and the main context of the letter (in Chinese), please see http://
www.citact-xmu.com/plugin.php?mid=2&hcid=13&id=3299 (visited 23 Nov 2013).
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According to this order, when a taxpayer finds tax normative rules issued 
by tax authorities inconsistent with the higher laws, he may apply to the 
rule-enacting tax authority or tax authority at a higher level to conduct a 
review on the legitimacy of such rules without entering into administrative 
review procedures or administrative litigation.119 As one official of the 
MoF commented, previously tax reform in China was carried out simply 
based on an official document jointly drafted by the MoF and the SAT 
and approved by the State Council. There was little room for civilians to 
participate and voice their opinions. However, this does not and will not 
work well any longer. In the near future, the cost of “game playing” in 
China’s tax reform will increase.120
3. Complying with International Tax Norms
Three decades ago, when the OECD and the UN laid down the two 
most influential models on tax treaties on income and capital providing 
templates for countries to follow in the conclusion of tax treaties, ie 
the OECD Model 1977 and the UN Model 1980, China just ended 
its chaos after the Cultural Revolution. At that time, the country was 
preoccupied by domestic reconstruction, seeking directions for economic 
development. The open-door policy, established in 1978 and implemented 
since then, gradually transformed China from being “an outsider” within 
the international tax community to being a more active and outspoken 
participant. Today, China has a broad treaty network in the tax field: tax 
treaties on income and capital with 99 countries, two tax arrangements 
with Macau and Hong Kong, tax information exchange agreements 
with 10 countries and a multilateral convention on tax administrative 
assistance.121 These treaties and arrangements have gained unprecedented 
significance today as a consequence of the rapidly growing volume of 
cross-border transactions in China’s economy.
Like domestic tax rules, the interpretation of tax treaties is rarely 
subject to review by the judiciary. The formulation of treaty interpretative 
rules mainly relies on the SAT. In the past 30 years, the way that the SAT 
119 Article 35, SAT Order No. 20, 2010.
120 This statement was uttered by Mr. Sun Gang, an official in the research institute of the MoF. 
See Lin Yan, Rediscover the Rights Hidden in Taxation (in Chinese), China Youth Daily, 
21 September 2011, available at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-09/21/nw.D110000zgqnb_
20110921_1-09.htm (visited 23 Dec 2013).
121 In August 2013, China entered into the Multilateral Convention on Tax Administrative 
Assistance which provides for different forms of administrative co-operation between states in 
the assessment and collection of taxes, in particular with a view to combating tax avoidance and 
evasion. The list of tax treaties China has entered into is available at http://www.chinatax.gov.
cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8687294/8688432.html (visited 23 Aug 2013).
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interpreted tax treaties has experienced noticeable changes: from adopting 
a scattered and fragmented approach by randomly interpreting a provision 
in one certain tax treaty, to using the systematic and comprehensive 
approach to give an overall technical explanation to provisions alike 
in every treaty;122 from translating the commentaries of the OECD 
Model and the UN Model and transplanting rules therein, to bringing 
up innovative solutions to clarify certain concepts that are ambiguous 
under the OECD Model and the UN Model.123 The growing expertise 
of the SAT on the interpretation of tax treaties, to some extent, can be 
attributable to its active participation in international organizations and 
more frequent dialogues with its treaty partners.
 (1) As a non-member state of the OECD, China has engaged in 
various discussions with respect to the revision of the OECD 
commentary as an observer state.124 Consequentially, a large 
body of interpretative rules issued by the SAT resembles the 
content in the OECD commentary.
 (2) In the UN Tax Committee, China took a key position in shaping 
and refining tax policy in favour of developing countries.125 
It has become more vocal in articulating opinions on international 
tax matters.
 (3) As a member state of the G-20, China has been playing an 
active role in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes and keeps improving domestic 
laws to live up to the international standard.126
122 One of the examples is the promulgation of Circular [2010] No. 75. In this circular, the detailed 
interpretation is given to every single provision in the China–Singapore tax treaties at great 
length and the guidance therein can be used to interpret other treaties China has concluded 
when the same provisions are included. See SAT, Interpretation Notes on the Double Tax 
Agreement Concluded between China and Singapore, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, promulgated 
on 26 July 2010.
123 One example is the interpretation on the “profits from the operation of international traffic” 
under tax treaties. According to the OECD commentary, such profits shall include those 
obtained from the wet lease of ships, i.e. leasing a ship on charter fully equipped, crewed and 
supplied. However, based on the SAT Circular [2010] No. 75, profits from the wet lease of 
ships shall not be included in the “profits from the operation of international traffic” unless the 
companies which derives profits from the operation of international traffic carry out the main 
business on international transportation, and the affiliated business, such as the wet lease of 
ships, does not exceed 10 per cent of the gross income within an accounting year.
124 Li Jinyan, “The Great Fiscal Wall of China: Tax Treaties and Their Role in Defining and 
Defending China’s Tax Base”, (2012) 66(9) Bulletin for International Taxation 452–453.
125 In July 2013, Mr. Liao Tizhong, the deputy director general of international taxation in the SAT 
was selected as a member of the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters for a new term starting from July 2013 to June 2017. See http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol = E/2013/9/Add.10&Lang = E (visited 3 Jan 2014).
126 General Office of the SAT, China Successfully Passed the Peer Review of Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (21 June 2012), available at http://
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n6669073/n6669118/12021099.html (visited 23 Aug 2013).
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 (4) The SAT is actively engaging in the dialogue with the partners 
to tax treaties or arrangements to continually polish its treaty 
interpretation. One of the salient examples is the interpretation 
of treaty notion of “beneficial ownership”.127
VII. Conclusion
The unique feature in the interpretation of tax laws in China is that 
administrative organs have enjoyed a near monopoly status in interpreting 
rules. Problems arise due to the high centralization of powers and the lack 
of effective checks. These problems include ultra vires interpretations, 
inconsistencies among the rules, retroactive application, infringement to 
taxpayers’ rights without available channels for remedies, etc.
In contrast to the strong stance of administrative bodies, the judiciary 
has been and may continue to remain weak in the tax field in the years to 
come especially when the cultural legacy, legal barriers and institutional 
hindrance are taken into account. The legislature has de facto laid aside 
its legislative power to interpret tax laws for three decades. The proper 
exercise of this power in the area of tax law depends on the self-restoration 
of the legislation power by the legislature.
This status quo in tax laws interpretation in China may continue in the 
short-medium term. However, it does not mean that the existing problems 
are incurable or cannot be alleviated to some extent. The momentum 
for changes stem from a range of factors. Thus, administrative bodies, 
motivated by internal regulatory constraints and external supervision, are 
moving forward themselves so as to adhere more closely to basic rule of 
law principles. Ordinary citizens, tax professionals and non-government 
organizations have begun to make their voices heard through various 
channels when tax rules are illegitimately or inappropriately interpreted 
by government agencies leading to adverse effects on taxpayers’ rights. 
Moreover, the integration of China into the international tax community 
requires the government to be more attentive to international norms and 
the practice in other countries. Some modest but significant steps are 
now being taken. There is still a long way to go, but as Lao Tzu once 
wisely advised, every journey begins with a single step.
127 From 2009 to 2014, SAT issued four circulars to clarify the meaning of the treaty term “beneficial 
owner”, ie SAT Circular [2009] No. 601, SAT Bulletin [2012] No. 30, SAT Circular [2013] No. 
165 and SAT Order [2014] No. 24. The way how the SAT interpreted this term in Circular [2009] 
No. 601 is innovative and aroused the widespread discussion in the international arena; see eg 
Nolan Sharkey, “China’s Tax Treaties and Beneficial Ownership: Innovative Control of Treaty 
Shopping or Inferior Law-making Damaging to International Law?” (2011) 65(12) Bulletin for 
International Taxation 655–661; Dongmei Qiu, “The Concept of ‘Beneficial Ownership’ in China’s 
Tax Treaties – the Current State of Play” (2013) 67(2) Bulletin for International Taxation 98–104.
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